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Documents authored by Kiayias, Aggelos

Document
Complete Volume
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022
OASIcs, Volume 110, Tokenomics 2022, Complete Volume

Authors: Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou, Aggelos Kiayias, and Marianne Verdier

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 110, 4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)

Abstract
OASIcs, Volume 110, Tokenomics 2022, Complete Volume
Cite as

4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 110, pp. 1-82, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@Proceedings{amoussouguenou_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022,
  title =	{{OASIcs, Volume 110, Tokenomics 2022, Complete Volume}},
  booktitle =	{4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)},
  pages =	{1--82},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-274-7},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{110},
  editor =	{Amoussou-Guenou, Yackolley and Kiayias, Aggelos and Verdier, Marianne},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-184169},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022},
  annote =	{Keywords: OASIcs, Volume 110, Tokenomics 2022, Complete Volume}
}
Document
Front Matter
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.0
Front Matter, Table of Contents, Preface, Conference Organization

Authors: Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou, Aggelos Kiayias, and Marianne Verdier

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 110, 4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)

Abstract
Front Matter, Table of Contents, Preface, Conference Organization
Cite as

4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 110, pp. 0:i-0:xii, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@InProceedings{amoussouguenou_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.0,
  author =	{Amoussou-Guenou, Yackolley and Kiayias, Aggelos and Verdier, Marianne},
  title =	{{Front Matter, Table of Contents, Preface, Conference Organization}},
  booktitle =	{4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)},
  pages =	{0:i--0:xii},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-274-7},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{110},
  editor =	{Amoussou-Guenou, Yackolley and Kiayias, Aggelos and Verdier, Marianne},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.0},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-184172},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.0},
  annote =	{Keywords: Front Matter, Table of Contents, Preface, Conference Organization}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.3
A Puff of Steem: Security Analysis of Decentralized Content Curation

Authors: Aggelos Kiayias, Benjamin Livshits, Andrés Monteoliva Mosteiro, and Orfeas Stefanos Thyfronitis Litos

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 71, International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)

Abstract
Decentralized content curation is the process through which uploaded posts are ranked and filtered based exclusively on users' feedback. Platforms such as the blockchain-based Steemit employ this type of curation while providing monetary incentives to promote the visibility of high quality posts according to the perception of the participants. Despite the wide adoption of the platform very little is known regarding its performance and resilience characteristics. In this work, we provide a formal model for decentralized content curation that identifies salient complexity and game-theoretic measures of performance and resilience to selfish participants. Armed with our model, we provide a first analysis of Steemit identifying the conditions under which the system can be expected to correctly converge to curation while we demonstrate its susceptibility to selfish participant behaviour. We validate our theoretical results with system simulations in various scenarios.
Cite as

Aggelos Kiayias, Benjamin Livshits, Andrés Monteoliva Mosteiro, and Orfeas Stefanos Thyfronitis Litos. A Puff of Steem: Security Analysis of Decentralized Content Curation. In International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 71, pp. 3:1-3:21, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)

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@InProceedings{kiayias_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.3,
  author =	{Kiayias, Aggelos and Livshits, Benjamin and Monteoliva Mosteiro, Andr\'{e}s and Thyfronitis Litos, Orfeas Stefanos},
  title =	{{A Puff of Steem: Security Analysis of Decentralized Content Curation}},
  booktitle =	{International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)},
  pages =	{3:1--3:21},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-108-5},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2020},
  volume =	{71},
  editor =	{Danos, Vincent and Herlihy, Maurice and Potop-Butucaru, Maria and Prat, Julien and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.3},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-119675},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.3},
  annote =	{Keywords: blockchain, content curation, decentralized, voting}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.7
Cryptocurrency Egalitarianism: A Quantitative Approach

Authors: Dimitris Karakostas, Aggelos Kiayias, Christos Nasikas, and Dionysis Zindros

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 71, International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)

Abstract
Since the invention of Bitcoin one decade ago, numerous cryptocurrencies have sprung into existence. Among these, proof-of-work is the most common mechanism for achieving consensus, whilst a number of coins have adopted "ASIC-resistance" as a desirable property, claiming to be more "egalitarian," where egalitarianism refers to the power of each coin to participate in the creation of new coins. While proof-of-work consensus dominates the space, several new cryptocurrencies employ alternative consensus, such as proof-of-stake in which block minting opportunities are based on monetary ownership. A core criticism of proof-of-stake revolves around it being less egalitarian by making the rich richer, as opposed to proof-of-work in which everyone can contribute equally according to their computational power. In this paper, we give the first quantitative definition of a cryptocurrency’s egalitarianism. Based on our definition, we measure the egalitarianism of popular cryptocurrencies that (may or may not) employ ASIC-resistance, among them Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litecoin, and Monero. Our simulations show, as expected, that ASIC-resistance increases a cryptocurrency’s egalitarianism. We also measure the egalitarianism of a stake-based protocol, Ouroboros, and a hybrid proof-of-stake/proof-of-work cryptocurrency, Decred. We show that stake-based cryptocurrencies, under correctly selected parameters, can be perfectly egalitarian, perhaps contradicting folklore belief.
Cite as

Dimitris Karakostas, Aggelos Kiayias, Christos Nasikas, and Dionysis Zindros. Cryptocurrency Egalitarianism: A Quantitative Approach. In International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 71, pp. 7:1-7:21, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)

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@InProceedings{karakostas_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.7,
  author =	{Karakostas, Dimitris and Kiayias, Aggelos and Nasikas, Christos and Zindros, Dionysis},
  title =	{{Cryptocurrency Egalitarianism: A Quantitative Approach}},
  booktitle =	{International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)},
  pages =	{7:1--7:21},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-108-5},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2020},
  volume =	{71},
  editor =	{Danos, Vincent and Herlihy, Maurice and Potop-Butucaru, Maria and Prat, Julien and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.7},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-119715},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.7},
  annote =	{Keywords: blockchain, egalitarianism, cryptocurrency, economics, proof-of-work, proof-of-stake}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.08491.5
Sound and Fine-grain Specification of Ideal Functionalities

Authors: Juan Garay, Aggelos Kiayias, and Hong-Sheng Zhou

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 8491, Theoretical Foundations of Practical Information Security (2009)

Abstract
Nowadays it is widely accepted to formulate the security of a protocol carrying out a given task via the "trusted-party paradigm," where the protocol execution is compared with an ideal process where the outputs are computed by a trusted party that sees all the inputs. A protocol is said to securely carry out a given task if running the protocol with a realistic adversary amounts to "emulating" the ideal process with the appropriate trusted party. In the Universal Composability (UC) framework the program run by the trusted party is called an ideal functionality. While this simulation-based security formulation provides strong security guarantees, its usefulness is contingent on the properties and correct specification of the ideal functionality, which, as demonstrated in recent years by the coexistence of complex, multiple functionalities for the same task as well as by their "unstable" nature, does not seem to be an easy task. In this paper we address this problem, by introducing a general methodology for the sound specification of ideal functionalities. First, we introduce the class of canonical ideal functionalities for a cryptographic task, which unifies the syntactic specification of a large class of cryptographic tasks under the same basic template functionality. Furthermore, this representation enables the isolation of the individual properties of a cryptographic task as separate members of the corresponding class. By endowing the class of canonical functionalities with an algebraic structure we are able to combine basic functionalities to a single final canonical functionality for a given task. Effectively, this puts forth a bottom-up approach for the specification of ideal functionalities: first one defines a set of basic constituent functionalities for the task at hand, and then combines them into a single ideal functionality taking advantage of the algebraic structure. In our framework, the constituent functionalities of a task can be derived either directly or, following a translation strategy we introduce, from existing game-based definitions; such definitions have in many cases captured desired individual properties of cryptographic tasks, albeit in less adversarial settings than universal composition. Our translation methodology entails a sequence of steps that derive a corresponding canonical functionality given a game-based definition. In this way, we obtain a well-defined mapping of game-based security properties to their corresponding UC counterparts. Finally, we demonstrate the power of our approach by applying our methodology to a variety of basic cryptographic tasks, including commitments, digital signatures, zero-knowledge proofs, and oblivious transfer. While in some cases our derived canonical functionalities are equivalent to existing formulations, thus attesting to the validity of our approach, in others they differ, enabling us to "debug" previous definitions and pinpoint their shortcomings.
Cite as

Juan Garay, Aggelos Kiayias, and Hong-Sheng Zhou. Sound and Fine-grain Specification of Ideal Functionalities. In Theoretical Foundations of Practical Information Security. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 8491, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2009)

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@InProceedings{garay_et_al:DagSemProc.08491.5,
  author =	{Garay, Juan and Kiayias, Aggelos and Zhou, Hong-Sheng},
  title =	{{Sound and Fine-grain Specification of Ideal Functionalities}},
  booktitle =	{Theoretical Foundations of Practical Information Security},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2009},
  volume =	{8491},
  editor =	{Ran Canetti and Shafi Goldwasser and G\"{u}nter M\"{u}ller and Rainer Steinwandt},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.08491.5},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-18911},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.08491.5},
  annote =	{Keywords: Security definitions, universal composability, cryptographic protocols, lattices and partial orders.}
}
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